One of the hotly debated subjects in philosophy is whether duty is a means to an end or whether it is an end in itself. There are eminent philosophers who take rival positions on this important question and therefore it is of interest to know the manner in which Vedic philosophy resolves this controversy. For purposes of this discussion, we assume a knowledge of the four goals of human life according to Vedic philosophy: the two secular goals of pleasure and security (artha and kama), and the last two spiritual goals (dharma and moksha) which we have already discussed elsewhere. This conception of values as embodied in these four goals provides the framework for investigating the meaning of duty from the very source where the conflicting views arise.
If actions are exclusively devoted to the satisfaction of the secular goals, without any thought given to advance towards the achievement of spiritual goals, they are not deemed as moral actions. This distinguishing feature of moral actions gives rise to the negative criterion for duty; moral life would per force necessitate placing suitable constraints on the reckless pursuit of seeking gratification of one’s natural inclinations of life. Pursuit of secular goals while they are both essential and legitimate, their limitless pursuits, however, are deemed harmful for working for the higher goals in life. The nature of the limiting constraints that ensures that no such harm is done will become clear as we proceed to formulate a positive purpose for performing duty.
We shall next examine what sorts of actions are deemed appropriate for the pursuit of spiritual goals. Such actions are called moral actions. It is common knowledge that all actions are performed with definite ends in view, and moral actions are no exception in this regard. No action is possible without the consciousness of an end in view; it will always have a positive purpose. It follows from this observation that if moral actions do not result in the achievement of the ends, the limits placed on the pursuit of secular goals, which constitute the negative criterion of moral action, will be utterly meaningless since they only impose unnecessary hardship on the agent. No rational being will subscribe to the concept of duty that is barren of a positive purpose. We will investigate what this purpose could be by considering several possibilities.
The happiness derived from meeting secular goals without any constraints imposed on them is called egoistic hedonism. It considers the pursuit of pleasures and security as the be all and end all of life. If such a pattern of life is not considered moral, one could then examine whether egoistic hedonism along with a universal form of it, namely, bestowing equal care on ensuring the well-being of others exclusively in the secular realm could serve as the positive purpose of a moral action. But a combined form of these two forms of hedonism, the egoistic and the universal, is considered impossible since experience informs us that one’s own interests are very often at odds with the interests of others and it is impossible to bring about a reconciliation between the two. Consequently, this possibility also has to be abandoned in our search for a positive purpose for duty.
We shall next examine whether disinterested altruism could serve as a useful approach to the problem that we have posed. By this we mean, that an agent is neither interested in egoistic hedonism nor in the concurrent pursuit of egoistic hedonism and universal hedonism. Instead, he is totally interested in working for the secular welfare of others. But this possibility also has several inherent weaknesses to it. First of all, it is patently absurd to assume that one could unfailingly achieve someone else’s happiness at all times through one’s actions. What the other person does for himself will also naturally influence the agent's state of mind. Secondly, even if an action is performed with a bad intention towards another person it can, under some circumstances, result in immense benefit to the other; one may be blissfully unaware of the motive of the action of the benefactor and will gladly accept the result if it suits the recipient's purpose, without
any interest in psycho-analyzing the intentions of the benefactor. In either case, we come to the conclusion that disinterested altruism cannot provide the positive purpose for duty.
Having disposed of the above three possibilities in our search for a positive purpose for a moral action, we finally track it down to the situation where it arises. We start our discussion of this case by first recalling our basic observation that self-consciousness is a special endowment of human beings. In our discussion of Ethics, we stated the principle of reciprocity in human relations, a principle that logically followed from the very plausible inference that others also have likes and dislikes similar to those of what we experience. The principle, in a nutshell, states that wisdom would behoove that we do good to others in order to ensure equally good reciprocal treatment from them. We further pointed out that the reciprocity principle that is based on conscious fellowship remains only in the realm of thought, but, in practice, it results in a clash between thought and action because of people’s natural propensity to accord better preference to the satisfaction of their own interests compared to those of others. We accounted this unfortunate failing to the double nature of the human mind, resulting from the inner conflict between the lower self that looks to the preservation of one’s own interests as a matter of priority and the higher self which goads one to place others’ interests above those of one’s own. It is essentially a conflict between thought and will, the thought that vouches for the soundness of the reciprocity principle and the will that pulls in the opposite direction of not putting it into practice.
The positive purpose of a moral action can be clearly defined in terms of the dilemma posed by the double nature of the mind. It is to eliminate the cleavage that exists between the lower self and the higher self by means of rectification of the will to facilitate the response to the prompting of the higher self. A moral action has two facets to it: first, it should be able to curb the undisciplined impulses that are solely directed towards the satisfaction of the natural inclinations; this is the negative aspect of moral action. The second facet to moral action, which is a positive one, is to ensure that all actions are done with the superior purpose of harnessing the will in the proper direction. It is only in the field of action that one can introduce the constant corrections to the human will and bring it in synchronism with what is expected of it by the higher self. Although we have discussed the two aspects of moral action separately for purposes of analysis, what happens in practice is that progress achieved in one aspect will bring about progress in the other because they are mutually coupled. All actions for doing altruistic deeds are viewed as opportunities for achieving this higher discipline, the rectification of the will, and with practice, they become second nature to the individual and so effortless in nature. The importance of doing altruistic deeds is not in the external consequences of the deeds, but because of the opportunities they afford for the internal cultivation of the mind. By this observation, we are not suggesting that one should be indifferent to the good of others, but we are only drawing attention to the primary purpose of heeding the call of the higher self. Constant practice in the rectification and transformation of the will result in a state of happiness that is much superior to the state of happiness that characterizes egoistic hedonism. The latter type of happiness is only transitory in nature whereas the former one is stable and enduring. If this were not true, and if we were only left with the onerous task of satisfying the negative condition, life would have been one of meaningless drudgery. It is the happiness resulting from the positive purpose that provides the necessary incentive for the transformation of one’s own personality by performing the right type of moral actions.
Normally speaking, when we perform an action, we are conscious of the results we are expecting from it. But, while performing a duty, we cannot always be conscious of the final aim of rectification of the will which is rather in the abstract realm. The immediate incentive for a moral action comes from our ability to distinguish what is right from wrong and accordingly act on what is right. The main reason for not being conscious of the final aim in any single action is because all actions have the same purpose: strengthen the will so that the gap between thought and action in the light of the reciprocity principle is continually reduced with the resulting happiness that follows from it. But more importantly, the result of a moral action is not external to duty; it is not something that accrues after its performance. The reward for a moral action is contained in the process itself. This is in stark contrast to what we normally mean by an action where results follow an action. Egoistic hedonism or a universal form of hedonism that we discussed earlier are examples where results are external to the actions performed. Such results may or may not follow the actions, whereas there is no such uncertainty involved in the performance of a duty; it will undoubtedly result in the further rectification of the will. The resulting happiness, being associated with the higher self, is of a much superior and enduring type than the kind of pleasure that one experiences in the satisfaction of purely secular goals. In fact, the secular end and the spiritual end result in altogether two different orders of happiness.
Reverting back to the controversy whether duty is a means to an end or an end in itself, we can suggest a solution to this riddle by pointing out that the conflict is not between duty and end, but between the two orders of end; the lower order that is associated with the sole satisfaction of the secular goals and the higher order that is associated with the continual refinement of the human will inspired by the spiritual goals. The school which holds that duty is a means to an end is correct in its assertion when the end considered is the secular end. And the school which holds that duty is an end in itself is also correct in holding that position when the end considered is the spiritual goal where the end is not external to duty. An action becomes moral when it selects the higher order in preference to the lower. By moral life, we mean that one has given permanent commitment to the performance of duty.
At this final stage of our discussion, we wish to point out where the connection to metaphysics becomes necessary to explore the complete meaning of duty. We started the discussion for identifying the positive purpose of moral action on the concepts of the principle of reciprocity and the double nature of the mind consisting of the higher self and the lower self. The cleavage between the two is never completely reconciled unless we have the concept of the highest self which is a metaphysical concept. It is the Self of Vedic philosophy that is not in time but in eternity and which represents the highest ideal of life.
It represents a state not only of moral rectification but of total moral perfection. There is nothing about such an attainment. Attainment of this ideal is what is called moksha which is the highest conception of value on the part of a human being. We have not brought in this concept of Self for our discussion because it was possible to deduce the true meaning of duty even by confining our discussion to the finite world of time and appealing to facts based on experience of our human condition. Accordingly, the concept of higher self was all that was necessary for the purpose. Furthermore, the rate of change that occurs in practice of the higher self is such that our discussion will not lose its meaning without appealing to the Self. The results will be valid for anyone living in any society for a considerable length of time.
In conclusion, we wish to state that the concept of Self should not be looked upon as a distant and misty ideal. Intellectual knowledge of it combined with a life devoted to moral rectification will enable a person to experience a glimpse of it through a yogic discipline. That is the assurance given by people all over the world who have followed this path. It is the momentary experiences of Self, the final goal of life, that has the certain potential to dissolve all manner of doubts about the wisdom of opting for leading a moral life. A person who is leading such a life will not have any confusion about the meaning of duty; it is both a means to an end as well as an end in itself in the light of what we have defined as the two distinct ends.